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TAGS: [KNNP](#) [MNUC](#) [PARM](#) [UNSC](#) [PREL](#) [IR](#) [ETTC](#) [GM](#)  
SUBJECT: OCT. 7 IRAN MEETING: GERMANY COMMITTED TO  
SANCTIONS, BUT PREFERS UNSC

REF: STATE 100765

Classified By: DCM Greg Delawie for reasons 1.4 b/d.

11. (S) SUMMARY. The German Chancellery's Deputy National Security Advisor equivalent, Nickel, stressed to the DCM, in an October 1 meeting, that Chancellor Merkel remained committed to pursuing serious sanctions should Iran not cooperate on the nuclear dossier. However, both Nickel and MFA officials emphasized, in separate meetings, Germany's preference for seeing action on Iran in the UNSC vice the EU and indicated that according to their calculations Russia might be less of an obstacle than previously thought. MFA Iran/Iraq/Gulf DAS Tarraf noted that Germany may be unable to "make concrete decisions" on specific measures during the October 7 meeting in Washington, because more time would be needed to pre-clear such measures. An MFA official also told PolOff that the results of the October 1 P5 1 meeting with Iran had prompted Germany to start thinking about other creative confidence-building measures to be used in the ongoing negotiations with Iran. END SUMMARY.

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Chancellor is Committed to Sanctions  
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12. (C) The DCM discussed Iran with Chancellery Foreign and Security Policy and Global Affairs Director Nickel on October 11. Nickel reported that the September 25 Merkel-Medvedev bi-lat had been productive on Iran. The Chancellor came away from the meeting more positive on Russia than she had been in two years. Nickel said Germany no longer thought Russia would veto a UNSCR, if it turned out that Iran refused to cooperate on the nuclear dossier. Nickel also stressed that Germany remained committed to pursuing serious sanctions should Iran not cooperate. He emphasized the importance of pursuing sanctions within the UNSC framework if possible. If UNSC action proves untenable, he stressed the importance of pulling Asian countries into the "like-minded" group. Although Chancellor Merkel's new coalition partner, the Free Democratic Party (FDP), is closer to business interests and could be tougher to persuade on sanctions, Nickel said he doesn't think it will be a problem for the Chancellor to convince them. He repeated that "the Chancellor is committed to sanctions."

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Oct. 7: Germany Ready to Discuss, but not Ready to Decide  
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13. (S) German MFA officials told PolOff September 30 and October 1 that Germany was concerned that while they realize the necessity of "parallel tracks" they didn't want to see the October 7 meeting of "likeminded" countries in any way damage chances of success in the UNSC should Iran not live up to its obligations. MFA Arms Control/ IAEA Deputy Director

Hinrichsen suggested the U.S. might consider letting Russia and China know the meeting would be happening -) since "they will find out anyway" -- and it would be better if they found out in a transparent manner. If Iran should fail to live up to its end of the bargain, Germany remains prepared to support sanctions in the UNSC. If a UNSCR weren't possible, Germany would be prepared to push in the EU and with likeminded countries, but they seek assurances that the U.S. also sees the UNSC as &Plan A.8

¶4. (S) MFA Iran/Iraq/Gulf DAS Tarraf also noted that Germany may be unable to "make concrete decisions" on specific measures during the October 7 meeting in Washington, because they would need more time to pre-clear such measures through the somewhat cumbersome German government (which is also at the moment somewhat distracted by coalition negotiations.) Germany had been working off of the UK September 20 paper and had gotten approval at the sub-ministerial level for a list of measures based on that paper -- though Tarraf wouldn't elaborate on what they were. After the meeting an Iran Desk officer told PolOff that "in general" the German paper "was not too far away" from the U.S. paper. Tarraf took great pains to explain that Germany does not want to be perceived as slow-rolling this process, they are "with us in spirit" but just can't get their bureaucracy moving this fast. Tarraf noted that he wished we had shared the paper earlier.

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German Thinking on "Creative Confidence Building Measures"  
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¶5. (S) Hinrichsen told poloff October 2 that the results of the October 1 P5 1 meeting with Iran had prompted Germany to

start thinking about other creative confidence-building measures that that the Iranians might be interested in. He said the MFA was working on some suggestions that they hoped to have ready before the October 7 restricted breakfast meeting. One idea he mentioned involved converting enrichment related machinery for use in "isotope separation" (used in the manufacturing of microchips) which he explained could then be sold on the market, provide a monetary incentive. However, he cautioned that they hadn't fully prepared the idea and that German experts were still being consulted.

Murphy